ATSIC's achievements and strengths: Implications for institutional reform by Sanders, Will
ATSIC’s Achievements and Strengths: 
Implications for Institutional Reform
Dr Will Sanders
August 2004
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
Will Sanders is a Fellow at the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy 
Research, The Australian National University, Canberra.
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
ATSIC’S ACHIEVEMENTS AND STRENGTHS i
Published only on the World Wide Web at: <www.anu.edu.au/caepr/>
CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................................1
Political participation of Indigenous people ............................................................................................................................1
A national Indigenous voice increasingly independent of government..........................................................................2
Distinctive, appropriate programs................................................................................................................................................3
Regionalism.........................................................................................................................................................................................4
Working with States and Territories............................................................................................................................................4
Distinctive Torres Strait Islander arrangements.......................................................................................................................5




CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
Thanks to Peter Nicholson for permission to reprint this cartoon from the Weekend Australian of 17 April 2004.
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
ATSIC’S ACHIEVEMENTS AND STRENGTHS 1
INTRODUCTION
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) has been criticized from many sides in the 
fi fteen years since it was established. Recently, with the 2003 ATSIC review panel and then in April 2004 with 
announcements by both Labor and the Coalition that they intended to abolish ATSIC, identifi cation of ATSIC’s 
weaknesses and failures has become even more prevalent. The current Senate select committee inquiry, initiated 
in response to the Coalition government’s ATSIC Amendment Bill 2004 introduced in late May, is providing yet 
another forum for the airing of criticism. But what about ATSIC’s achievements and strengths? I want to argue 
that, over its fourteen year history, ATSIC has indeed achieved much and displayed considerable strengths. This 
needs to be acknowledged and understood in current processes of institutional reform. Otherwise learning 
from ATSIC will only be negative, about what not to do. We also need to understand what worked in ATSIC and 
how that can be built on.
I discuss ATSIC’s achievements and strengths under six headings:
• political participation of Indigenous people, 
• a national Indigenous voice increasingly independent of government, 
• distinctive, appropriate programs,
• regionalism, 
• working with States and Territories, and
• distinctive Torres Strait Islander arrangements.
I believe all these areas of achievement and strength are signifi cant and need to be built on in current processes 
of institutional reform. 
My concluding comments begin with some of the fi ndings of the fi nal report of the 2003 ATSIC review panel, 
which sought to restructure rather than abolish ATSIC. This approach refl ected the fi ndings of an earlier 
Public Discussion Paper produced by the review which noted that there was ‘overwhelming support among 
key stakeholders’ for a national body representative of Indigenous people’s interests even though there was 
‘very little support for ATSIC’s current performance’ (Hannaford, Collins and Huggins 2003: 24). I too would 
argue that there is support and a need for a national Indigenous representative body and that ATSIC should 
not be abolished unless, or until, some replacement representative arrangement is negotiated with Indigenous 
people.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
Together with colleagues, I have long argued that ATSIC has attracted signifi cant levels of participation 
among Indigenous people (Sanders, Taylor and Ross 2000, Sanders 2004a). ATSIC offi ce has been sought by 
over a thousand Indigenous people at all fi ve rounds of elections since 1990. Numbers of voters have grown 
signifi cantly and fairly steadily, from 39,000 in 1990 to 54,000 in 2002. How these numbers convert to voter 
participation rates is hard to determine, given that there is no national Indigenous electoral roll and that the 
census enumeration of Indigenous people is volatile. However, they at least amount to a national Indigenous 
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voter participation rate of over 20 per cent, and considerably higher than this in some areas. In Tasmania, where 
a roll was drawn up in 2002, 55 per cent of those who were admitted to the roll then went on to vote (Sanders 
2004b). In the 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Survey, 39 per cent of those interviewed had 
voted in the 1993 ATSIC elections. These are substantial levels of Indigenous political participation.
ATSIC has also given those elected signifi cant opportunities for developing a public profi le and participating in 
public debate. This applies not only to the chairperson and national commissioners, but also to regional council 
chairs and, to a lesser extent, ordinary regional councilors. ATSIC offi ce holding has given many Indigenous 
people a status in the community which has meant that their opinions on public issues have been sought and 
valued. Although there are other forms of Indigenous leadership, ATSIC offi ce holding has certainly become 
important, in relation to both the Indigenous and the larger communities.
A NATIONAL INDIGENOUS VOICE INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT
In its early days ATSIC was often criticized by Indigenous people as just another government agency. Having 
been created by the Commonwealth Parliament and coming, ultimately, under Commonwealth ministerial 
control, this was a legitimate criticism. However ATSIC has worked hard over the years to develop its credibility 
and legitimacy among Indigenous people by acting independently of government. In 1993 and then again in 
1997/98, ATSIC lined up against the Commonwealth and with the land councils in native title negotiations. 
In 1994/95, ATSIC applied for and obtained accredited Non-Government Organisation status at the United 
Nations, which it later used to present perspectives in UN forums quite different from those of the Australian 
government. Also in 1995, ATSIC submitted a wide ranging report to government entitled Recognition, Rights 
and Reform, which outlined a comprehensive program to further address social justice issues once native title 
had been legislatively recognized (ATSIC 1995). Since 2000, under the leadership of Geoff Clark, ATSIC has 
also begun promoting the idea of a treaty, or treaties, between Indigenous and other Australians even though 
this idea was dismissed by the Howard Commonwealth government. Hence not only has ATSIC facilitated the 
emergence of a national Indigenous voice on a number of issues of national importance, but it has increasingly 
been a voice which is independent of government.
As this increasing independence was emerging, one analyst and ATSIC-insider suggested that this was a 
strategic mistake; that ATSIC was unnecessarily distancing itself from involvement in the executive processes 
of government where it had an advantage in comparison to other Indigenous organizations and where it 
had a licence from the government to be involved (Dillon 1996). Others saw the independence as anomalous 
behaviour for an organization which would never be able to transcend its governmental origins (Sullivan 
1996). I would argue that ATSIC was obliged to develop its independence from government in order to build 
credibility and legitimacy with its Indigenous constituency. This was an achievement and strength for ATSIC, 
not a mistake or an anomaly. The challenge was for government to let ATSIC assert its independence, while 
still providing it with public resources and access to the executive. This is not always a comfortable position 
for governments. But it is necessary if a government-sponsored national Indigenous representative body is to 
have any credibility among Indigenous people.1
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DISTINCTIVE, APPROPRIATE PROGRAMS
ATSIC was not just an experiment in Indigenous representation. It also extended some executive power 
over select Indigenous-specifi c Commonwealth programs to these Indigenous representatives. ATSIC’s third 
achievement or strength was programs which were distinctive from those of other government agencies and 
were appropriate to the circumstances of Indigenous people. 
Foremost among these distinctive, appropriate programs was the Community Development Employment 
Projects (CDEP) scheme, a work-for-the-dole type program which had been created by ATSIC’s predecessor 
the Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs as far back as 1977 and which had proven enormously 
popular with Indigenous communities. Originally designed for remote Indigenous communities with signifi cant 
working-age populations but few employment opportunities, CDEP was expanding into southern, more urban 
areas by the time ATSIC inherited it. ATSIC managed the expansion of CDEP well, maintaining the fl exibility 
and focus on non-market work in remote communities, while also promoting CDEP’s use in the achievement 
of more general labour market outcomes for Indigenous people in more southern and urban areas. CDEP has 
accounted for over a third of ATSIC’s budget and a similar proportion of the Indigenous employed. Without 
CDEP, Indigenous unemployment would have been far higher during the ATSIC years and other government 
agencies would have had to think much harder about their program efforts in this area.
Another major example of a distinctive, appropriate program was ATSIC’s Community Housing and 
Infrastructure Program (CHIP), again inherited from ATSIC’s predecessor the Commonwealth Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs and dating back to the early 1970s. CHIP provided essential services and community rental 
housing to predominantly remote, discrete Indigenous communities, but also to some Indigenous communities 
in less discrete, more urban settings. In most instances CHIP operated in areas where other government and 
market providers of these services had not delivered essential services infrastructure or housing. Because of 
CHIP, community rental is a signifi cant housing tenure for Indigenous Australians, particularly those with low 
incomes and in remote areas. In the 2001 census, 13 per cent of Indigenous households were in community 
rental housing and in remote areas this fi gure rose to 44 per cent. Community rental is vastly more affordable 
than private rental and signifi cantly more affordable than even government rental, which is often not available 
in many remote areas serviced by CHIP. Again other agencies would have had to think much harder about their 
program efforts in housing and essential services infrastructure, were it not for ATSIC’s.
While CHIP and CDEP have been ATSIC’s big budget item programs, other ATSIC programs in areas like the arts, 
communications, native title representative body support and legal service support can also make strong claims 
to being both distinctive from general government programs in these areas and appropriate to Indigenous 
peoples circumstances. If such programs are to be administered in future by general government agencies, then 
those agencies will have to think much harder than they have in the past about how programs can be made 
appropriate to Indigenous peoples circumstances.2
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REGIONALISM
ATSIC was also a bold experiment in regionalism, trying to link the national and local in Indigenous affairs. 
Regional councils attempted to bring together diverse local interests and to feed their concerns to the national 
Board (see Smith 1996). This was not always successful, as early attempts at regional planning met with 
limited success and the gap within ATSIC between early regional councilors and national commissioners was 
keenly felt (see Finlayson and Dale 1996, Rowse 1996). One reaction to this was to delegate project funding 
decisions in some ATSIC programs to regional councils. But this too had its costs. Founding ATSIC chair, Lowitja 
O’Donoghue, argued by 1996 that delegation had been a mistake and made the councils too inward looking, 
as they focused on the sub-division of their own tiny program budgets. She argued for a ‘separation of powers’ 
within ATSIC and for councils to ‘concentrate on larger strategic and political issues, such as negotiating with 
other government agencies or levels of government to ensure that they fulfi lled their responsibilities to local 
Aboriginal communities’ (O’Donoghue 1997: 8). 
Although regional councils have remained involved in individual project funding decisions, there have been 
examples of them also becoming involved in larger strategic issues. Murdi Paaki regional council in western NSW 
has gained a reputation for working effectively with the local governments of its area, as well as encouraging 
innovative forms of Indigenous regional organisation. Similarly the Yarpakurlangu regional council in central 
eastern Northern Territory has worked well with the Tennant Creek town council on a range of issues. Other 
ATSIC regional councils too have become more outward looking, and not solely focused on their own meagre 
program budget. So ATSIC’s regionalism, too, has had its achievements. 
WORKING WITH STATES AND TERRITORIES
ATSIC has also worked usefully with States and Territories over the years. One of the earliest examples of this 
was a housing funding agreement made between the Northern Territory government, the Commonwealth 
and ATSIC in 1995. This agreement pooled ATSIC and Northern Territory government funds for Indigenous 
community housing and administered them through an authority comprising ATSIC regional council chairs 
and Northern Territory public servants. This Indigenous Housing Authority of the Northern Territory (IHANT) 
arrangement was clearly a signifi cant improvement on what had gone before and encouraged the development 
of similar innovative tripartite Indigenous housing agreements in the States over the next few years.
From 2000, ATSIC sought to make more general agreements with the State and Territory governments and 
to this end began rotating some Commission meetings through State and Territory capital cities. Agreements 
were signed with Victoria and Western Australia in 2000, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia 
(again) in 2001 and Queensland, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory in 2002. Although 
these agreements are often limited in their scope or general in their intent, and hence leave much work still 
to be done, they are indicative of achievement by ATSIC in working with the States and Territories. Indeed, if 
ATSIC is abolished, some of these sub-national governments will be faced with the issue of who to relate to as 
mandated Indigenous representatives. ATSIC was becoming as useful to them, as they to it.
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DISTINCTIVE TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER ARRANGEMENTS
The fi nal achievement or strength of ATSIC that I would note is its distinctive arrangements for Torres Strait 
Islanders. These are not just restricted to the Torres Strait Regional Authority, which the proposed ATSIC 
Amendment Bill 2004 leaves intact. They also include a Torres Strait Islander Advisory Board and an Offi ce of 
Torres Strait Islander Affairs, which the proposed ATSIC Amendment Bill abolishes. 
One of the great challenges of Torres Strait Islander affairs is to provide for the representation of Islanders 
who now live outside the Strait in other parts of Queensland and Australia and to articulate their interests 
with those of Islanders and others living in the Strait. These ‘mainland’ Torres Strait Islanders now outnumber 
‘homeland’ Torres Strait Islanders by up to fi ve or six to one, so the issue is a substantial one (see Sanders and 
Arthur 2001).The Torres Strait Islander Advisory Board and the Offi ce of Torres Strait Islander Affairs within 
ATSIC have been dedicated to articulating the interests of Torres Strait Islanders living outside the Strait. Their 
inclusion in the original ATSIC legislation was in many ways part of a larger package for the representation 
of Torres Strait Islander interests which will be drastically altered if only the Torres Strait Regional Authority 
remains after current institutional reform processes. Torres Strait Islanders living outside the Strait have never 
particularly liked their position within ATSIC outside the Torres Strait Regional Authority, but they will be 
bound to like even less the prospect of no representation of their interests at all. Distinctive Torres Strait 
Islander arrangements have, unequivocally, been one of ATSIC’s strengths.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS: ABOLITION OR REFORM?
The fi nal report of the 2003 ATSIC review identifi ed an ‘urgent need’ for ‘structural change’ in the organization. 
It argued for a ‘new leadership structure’ which drew more directly on regional councils in the hope that 
ATSIC might be more ‘directly shaped by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people at the regional level’. It 
saw ATSIC’s ‘most signifi cant challenges’ as being ‘to regain the confi dence of its constituents and work with 
them and government agencies and other sectors to ensure that needs and aspirations are met’ (Hannaford, 
Huggins and Collins 2003: 5). While the 2003 review clearly felt that ATSIC had experienced something of crisis 
of Indigenous and larger public confi dence in recent times, it was unequivocal that ATSIC should continue to 
exist. ATSIC, it argued:
should be the primary vehicle to represent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ views to all levels of 
government and be an agent for positive change in the development of policies and programs to advance the 
interests of Indigenous Australians (Hannaford, Huggins and Collins 2003: 8)
The ‘objects of the ATSIC Act’ dating from 1989, the review report argued, ‘remain completely relevant today’ 
and ‘should be retained’ (Hannaford, Huggins and Collins 2003: 8). Abolition of ATSIC was an option which the 
review report considered, but explicitly rejected (Hannaford, Huggins and Collins 2003: 80).
These fi ndings of the 2003 ATSIC review were, I believe, sound at the time and remain so today. The need for 
an Indigenous representative body which has both national and more regionalized components is compelling 
and overwhelming. It is due recognition within the Australian system of government both of the position of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as pre-existing political communities colonized without consent 
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and of the geographic and cultural diversity of such communities. It is a necessary part of treating the 
contemporary bearers of these senses of Indigenous political community with equality and respect, of what 
I have elsewhere referred as the recognition of an Indigenous order of Australian government or internal 
decolonization (Sanders 2000, 2002). 
To abolish ATSIC without having in place some alternative regional and national Indigenous representative 
arrangements within the Australian system of government would seem a backward step. Modern Indigenous 
affairs policy needs such elements of political recognition of Indigenous people as ATSIC has been. This is not 
to say that the ATSIC of the last fourteen years cannot be improved upon. But to abolish ATSIC might be, as 
cartoonist Peter Nicholson suggested back in April, to throw out the bathwater with the babies, the context 
and structure with the personalities (see the cartoon on page ii). The babies of Nicholson’s cartoon are, of 
course, the ATSIC elected chair and deputy chair returned after the 2002 ATSIC elections, Geoff Clark and 
Ray Robinson. If, for a variety of reasons which do not need to be canvassed here, these leaders had become 
unacceptable to the Commonwealth government, then this issue should have been dealt with on its own 
terms, through the existing available mechanisms such as ministerial intervention, rather than by wholesale 
institutional abolition. To get rid of ATSIC as a way of pushing aside a particular chairperson is like abolishing 
Parliament to push aside a particular Prime Minister. To use institutional reform for such personalized purposes 
is both wrong and a dangerous precedent, particularly when there are statutory mechanisms available for 
dealing with such issues. 
ATSIC should be reformed, rather than abolished, or at least its replacement as an Indigenous representative 
body should be negotiated with Indigenous people before abolition. As outlined above, the ATSIC of the last 
fourteen years does have many achievements and strengths on which to build.
NOTES
1 Weaver 1983 made this argument in relation to the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee and the National Aboriginal 
Conference.
2 Sanders 2001 contains arguments relating to how the social security system could think much harder about issues of 
appropriateness of rules and procedures to Indigenous peoples circumstances.
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